For Nearly Fifty Years, Foreign-Bribery Law Focused on the Payer. That Just Changed.
An appointment for a passport is a government service, not inventory a public official may sell. Federal prosecutors now allege that a former Honduran consul general in Atlanta turned access to consular appointments into a cash business. According to charges unsealed on November 16, Ada Evila Serrano Nuñez required a transportation and appointment-assistance company to collect a bribe for each client allowed into the consulate, then allegedly used staff and family members to move and conceal more than $375,000. Serrano and three other defendants are presumed innocent, and the government must prove its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. The case matters before any verdict because it is the Justice Department's first prosecution under the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act. For decades, American foreign-bribery law concentrated on the person offering or paying. Congress has now put the foreign official's demand on the other side of the ledger.
The first case began at the consulate door
The alleged facts are unusually concrete. The Honduran Consulate in Atlanta provided passports, travel documents, notary services, and civil records to Honduran citizens. Many visitors came from neighboring states and used a Tennessee company for transportation and appointment assistance. Prosecutors say that beginning in 2023, Serrano required that company to collect cash from each person who wanted access to an appointment.
The Northern District of Georgia alleges that consular staff received the cash, Serrano's adult sons deposited it into personal accounts in increments between $100 and $6,000, and Serrano sometimes received money directly. The government also alleges concealment through encrypted communications, limits on daily appointments, and warnings about cameras and microphones. Those details appear in the government's account of the indictment and complaint. They are allegations, not findings.
That distinction is essential. An indictment establishes that a grand jury found probable cause to charge. It does not prove the alleged payments, the defendants' knowledge, the meaning of their communications, or the statutory business connection. The three defendants charged by complaint likewise retain the presumption of innocence. A first prosecution will test a statute, but it should not be narrated as a first conviction.
The human setting is still important. The alleged leverage was not a conventional procurement award. It was access to documents and appointments that people needed from their own government. The business allegedly caught in the middle served those people by arranging appointments and transportation. FEPA reaches that demand only if the government can connect it to the statute's precise elements.
FEPA supplies the missing demand-side offense
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is built largely around the supply side of foreign bribery. It prohibits covered issuers, domestic concerns, and certain people acting in the United States from corruptly offering, promising, authorizing, or paying something of value to a foreign official for specified business purposes. That structure made the payer, and the payer's books and controls, the center of American enforcement.
FEPA addresses the mirror image. Current 18 U.S.C. § 1352 makes it a crime for a foreign official, or a person selected to become one, to corruptly demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept something of value from defined people or entities. The statute covers direct and indirect demands and benefits provided personally or for another person or nongovernmental entity.
The exchange still matters. The thing of value must be sought in return for influence over an official act or decision, an act or omission violating lawful duty, an improper advantage, or the use of official influence over a foreign government or instrumentality. It must also connect to obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. Those words prevent FEPA from becoming a general federal code for every abuse by a foreign public employee.
Congress gave the offense substantial reach. The law incorporates the FCPA's categories of issuers and domestic concerns, covers certain demands made while the official or an intermediary is in United States territory, and provides extraterritorial federal jurisdiction. A violation carries up to 15 years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000 or three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value. DOJ, not the SEC, enforces FEPA, and the statute creates no parallel civil remedy.
The symmetry is real, but it is not immunity
There is an intuitive appeal to describing FEPA as the other half of the FCPA. One statute reaches the covered offer or payment. The other reaches the covered demand or receipt. That symmetry gives prosecutors a tool aimed at officials who exploit companies and distort competition instead of treating every corruption case as a story about the payer alone.
The two statutes are not interchangeable. FEPA contains a rule of construction stating that its demand-side offense does not encompass conduct that would violate the FCPA, including through conspiracy or complicity theories. Congress did not create a substitute way to prosecute the payer under the new law. It created a distinct offense for the foreign official.
That separation also means a FEPA case against an official does not decide the payer's status. A business can be a victim of extortion, an important witness, a participant in an unlawful payment, or some combination that depends on the evidence and governing law. Pressure alone does not answer whether a payment violated the FCPA. The nature of the threat, the purpose of the payment, who authorized it, how it was recorded, and what the business did next can all matter.
The public announcements do not accuse the transportation company of a crime. They describe the alleged demand and identify the former consul general and three alleged intermediaries as defendants. It would be wrong to convert that charging decision into a general safe harbor for companies that pay demanded money. The disciplined conclusion is narrower: the United States can now investigate both sides with statutes written for different actors.
The first prosecution is a jurisdictional proof of concept
The first case is domestic in a way that simplifies some of FEPA's hardest questions. The relevant consulate was in Atlanta. The alleged official served there. The alleged intermediaries included consular staff and family members. The cash allegedly moved into personal bank accounts in Georgia. The company from which the money was allegedly demanded was located in Tennessee. The indictment therefore gives prosecutors a visible United States territory and interstate-commerce story.
Future cases may be harder. A demand made entirely abroad, through an intermediary, to a multinational subsidiary can produce disputes about who qualifies as a covered foreign official, whether the payer fits an incorporated FCPA category, which communication or transaction supplied the jurisdictional connection, and whether the requested benefit was tied to obtaining or retaining business. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is broad language, but it does not erase the offense's other elements.
Diplomatic status may also complicate some cases, although the public announcement identifies Serrano as a former consul general and says she was arrested after her service ended. The current charging documents, any motions, and the court's rulings will determine which defenses are actually presented. Headlines about the first prosecution cannot resolve immunity, statutory interpretation, admissibility, or proof in advance.
That is why this case deserves attention without triumphalism. DOJ selected allegations with a strong domestic footprint, identifiable official services, cash transfers, and alleged concealment. If proved, those facts may establish FEPA's usefulness. They will not automatically answer how the statute applies to a remote demand in a foreign licensing, customs, procurement, or tax dispute.
Companies need a record of the demand, not a story reconstructed later
The operational consequence arrives before any court construes the statute. Anti-corruption programs have long emphasized gifts, approvals, third parties, books and records, and outbound payments. FEPA makes the inbound demand a distinct object of investigation. A message, invoice, appointment restriction, altered queue, or request routed through a consultant can matter not only as context for an FCPA analysis but as potential evidence of a separate offense by the official.
Counsel receiving a report of an alleged shakedown should establish the facts before attaching a label. What exactly was requested? Who made the request and in what capacity? What official act, omission, advantage, or influence was offered in return? Which business interest was affected? Was any payment made, promised, authorized, disguised, or recorded? Who communicated with the official or intermediary, and what evidence still exists? Those questions serve both defense and reporting decisions.
The response should avoid two equal mistakes. The first is to treat coercion as automatic permission to pay. The second is to treat an employee who reports a demand as if the employee created the corruption risk. Preservation, controlled escalation, independent legal analysis, and protection against retaliation are more useful than a fast conclusion designed to make the incident disappear.
DOJ now invites reports of FEPA violations to the same Criminal Division unit that handles the FCPA. Reporting is a consequential legal decision, not a reflex, and it may affect employees, counterparties, foreign relations, privilege, disclosure duties, and parallel investigations. But a company that cannot reconstruct the demand will struggle to evaluate any of those choices. The best record is made while the pressure is occurring, not after prosecutors explain it in an indictment.
A new statute changes the investigation before it changes the verdict
FEPA's first prosecution does not prove that the statute will produce frequent charges, convictions, or cooperation from foreign governments. It does show that the law is no longer theoretical. A foreign official's demand can now be the charged federal offense rather than merely the background to an FCPA investigation of someone else.
That changes the strategic map for companies and counsel. Evidence that once served mainly to explain why a payment was considered can establish a separate case against the demander. A business confronting official pressure may have more leverage, but it also has more decisions to make about preservation, payment controls, employee safety, internal reporting, disclosure, and cooperation.
The sober position is neither that FEPA solves foreign corruption nor that it simply duplicates existing law. It gives American prosecutors a direct demand-side tool with demanding statutory elements and substantial penalties. The Atlanta case will now test how those words work against real defendants, real evidence, and the government's burden of proof.
Sources and further reading
Primary and industry sources used to support this page. External guidance should be reviewed in context and for your jurisdiction.
- U.S. Attorney's Office, first FEPA prosecutionOfficial November 16, 2026 account of the charges, alleged consular appointment scheme, alleged payment flow, arrests, and presumption of innocence.
- Justice Department national FEPA announcementOfficial announcement identifying the prosecution as the first under FEPA and describing the indictment, complaint, investigative agencies, and charging posture.
- 18 U.S.C. § 1352Current statutory text defining covered foreign officials, prohibited demands, business nexus, penalties, extraterritorial jurisdiction, reporting, and the FCPA rule of construction.
- DOJ Foreign Extortion Prevention Act overviewJustice Department explanation of FEPA's relationship to the FCPA, covered actors, penalties, enforcement authority, and reporting channel.
- 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1Current FCPA anti-bribery provision governing covered issuers and people acting on their behalf.
- 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2Current FCPA anti-bribery provision governing domestic concerns and people acting on their behalf.
- DOJ and SEC FCPA Resource GuideOfficial agency guide addressing FCPA coverage, jurisdiction, payments, defenses, accounting provisions, compliance programs, and resolutions.